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Sarah Broadie’s rich and subtle paper argues that both Plato
and Aristotle class as genuine virtue—not as a facade or a mere
scare-quoted “virtue”—the decency of those nonphilosophers
who do as virtue requires without reflection, or even on the
basis of misguided beliefs about why virtue is valuable. Such
are two figures who make brief but memorable appearances
near the end of two major ethical works: the Spartans of
Eudemian Ethics VIII.3 and the nameless unfortunate who
takes the spotlight in the Myth of Er, who by living in a well-
ordered state had “participated in virtue through habit and
without philosophy” (Rep. 619c)1  but who turns out to be
rudderless when faced with a free choice of his next life.
Broadie’s thesis is not a matter of terminology or emphasis, a
claim that Plato and Aristotle see the moral glass in these cases
as half-full rather than half-empty. Rather, her view is that we
can come to a clearer understanding of precisely what Platonic
and Aristotelian virtue consists in by seeing that decency—as I
will term the state of the person who acts virtuously without
understanding—counts as the real thing. (I will not have
anything to say about the differences between the two types of
decency represented in these texts, summarized by Broadie at
the end of her section 2: since both go wrong by overvaluing the
natural goods, they perhaps represent fundamentally the same
type.) On the “natural account,” as Broadie takes it to be, virtue
consists simply in a stable disposition to do the right actions
and to feel the right emotions as a direct response to external
events. And an agent’s views as to why anyone should be
virtuous are extraneous to these dispositions themselves: saying
that someone is a good person tells you no more about their
reasons for being good than describing someone as a good tennis
player tells you why they took up the game. Broadie is not
saying that those deeper questions are irrelevant to our overall
moral evaluations; nor is she denying that it is important to be
reflective in order to reach the right understanding of the value
of virtue. As she notes, virtue divorced from understanding
cannot be stably transmitted across generations—a major worry
on Plato’s mind in the Meno, Protagoras, and Laches, and
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perhaps expressed in eschatological form in the Myth of Er. But
this means that decency is a less valuable way of being virtuous
than the philosopher’s way, not that it is different in kind.
Broadie’s paper is not only an important contribution to our
understanding of how Plato and Aristotle conceived unphilo-
sophical virtue, a puzzle that has only recently begun to receive
the attention it deserves;2 it also gives vivid and original
insights into such matters of moral psychology as the possible
conflicts between the decent person’s theory and his practice
and the moral significance of fantasy—philosophy’s evil twin.
My comments will necessarily be narrower, and will fail to live
up to the sheer interestingness of Broadie’s paper.3  My prin-
cipal argument will be that her central claim should be rejected:
for good reasons Plato and Aristotle do not count mere decency
as virtue. My focus will be less on the direct textual evidence
for and against Broadie’s reading, much of which is ambiguous
along half-empty/half-full lines, than on some of the larger
philosophical considerations that drive her reading. For I agree
that there is something important to be learned about virtue
from considering how Plato and Aristotle treat the unphilo-
sophical decent person, but I disagree about what that is.
1. Virtue and Decency in Action
In discussing the “natural account” of virtue, Broadie brings out
an important way in which she thinks the natural account
recommends itself to us: namely, by serving to ward off a false
view, sometimes imputed to Aristotle, about what virtuous
agency involves. This view is that the virtuous agent must, in
acting for the sake of the fine, think some thought along the
lines: “This is the fine [or virtuous] thing to do.” Broadie takes
this thought to be not only unnecessary to the virtuous agent
(though it must, she admits, be available to him upon reflec-
tion); it threatens to “destroy the immediacy” (106) character-
istic of virtuous agency, curdling it into a kind of moral
narcissism. Even worse are the “superfluous and corrupting”
(107) thoughts of the allegedly virtuous agent whose reflection
involves rehearsing the eudaimonistic and egoistic rationale for
virtuous action, roughly: ‘This would be the fine and virtuous
thing to do, and doing the fine and virtuous thing is good for
the agent; so I can possess the good for myself by doing it’. In
order to exclude such “unpleasant self-reference” (107) from the
virtuous agent’s deliberation, Broadie emphasizes the
immediacy of the good person’s action. Properly conceived, the
generous person is one whose actions spring directly from her
perceptions of the needs of others, not from thoughts about how
generous it would be for her to act that way. Broadie goes so far
as to argue, implausibly, that Aristotle’s claim that the good
person acts “for the sake of the fine” can be understood as
merely a relation of “tracking” (113, n. 37). If this means merely
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that the virtuous person’s actions correlate reliably with what it
is fine to do, it cannot, I think, be right: “for the sake of ”
[heneka] picks out a causal relation, and the Aristotelian “final
cause” in particular. And though “for the sake of ” relations in
natural teleology need not involve deliberation or motivation at
all, this is the standard vehicle for final causality in human
agency. This is not to say, however, that action for the sake of
the “fine” must be assumed to invariably follow on deliberation
explicitly incorporating that concept; I will argue that it does
not.
Broadie’s concern here falls under the heading of worries
about “a thought too many” in moral deliberation. But questions
about what constitutes a thought too many are immensely
complicated and delicate, I think, and our intuitions may be
overly sensitive to the presentation of possible cases. (“This is
wrong; I cannot do it” has one sound, “This is wrong; I cannot
do it” quite another.) I will confine myself to three points here.
First, I am not sure that the Aristotelian agent who chooses
an action qua fine should really be thought of as thinking in a
self-referential or overly theorized way—even if he has avail-
able a eudaimonist rationale for acting for the sake of the fine,
and even if all his actions are in some sense a bid to possess the
good for himself. Why not think of him as an aesthete, moved
simply by the perception of a prospective action as beautiful, a
perception that follows directly on the realization that it would
help a friend, or uphold justice, or be what courage demands?
That does not seem to me to introduce an unhealthily wide gap
between agency and the external circumstances to which it
should respond. And though the issue is too large to explore
here, my impression is that Aristotle, like Plato, uses the
concept of the kalon precisely for what attracts and motivates
us immediately, without thought of one’s further advantage, or
of oneself at all.
Second, I think we need to distinguish carefully between the
propositions endorsed by and available to the moral agent and
the occurrent thoughts that play a more or less explicit role in
motivating her. Though the analogy can be misleading, I find it
natural to envisage the virtuous agent as a practitioner of
something like Kuhnian “normal science.” Like a scientist who
has adopted a scientific theory or paradigm, she works with a
framework of basic principles that determine what counts as a
relevant consideration and a correct procedure. She then goes
about doing her moral problem-solving without having to think
about her first principles all the time; the extent to which they
surface explicitly will depend on the nature of the problem at
hand. (There are of course problems and puzzles about how to
work out this analogy: for example, should eudaimonist argu-
ments in favor of the virtuous life be taken as first principles of
the “paradigm” of virtuous deliberation or as external argu-
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ments for adopting it?) Now Broadie’s central claims here are
perfectly consistent with this two-level picture: in fact, she
needs something like it to explain how Aristotle can say, as he
repeatedly does in VIII.3, that the decent person does not act
for the sake of the fine (1248b34-7, 1249a2-3, 5-6, 14-6). Within
the framework of virtue, the Spartan presumably does act for
the sake of the fine (otherwise he could not count as virtuous),
but the fine is not what motivated him to adopt it.
This “Kuhnian” picture should, it seems to me, be equally
available to every type of moral theory and certainly to every
viable interpretation of Aristotle. And it strongly suggests that
there is something unreal about the threat of “superfluous and
corrupting thoughts.” For such thoughts are most likely to be
attributed to the virtuous agent when the interpreter jumbles
together her occurrent thoughts with her “framework” commit-
ments. At the same time we cannot stipulate that the frame-
work commitments should never play a direct or explicit role in
deliberation; so far as I can see, no simple rule can be given as
to how much of the framework the virtuous agent might have to
summon up to get the deliberative job done. Broadie seems to
suggest that a well-oiled moral agent need never think “This
would be the virtuous thing to do.” But it seems to me that in
hard cases—if, for instance, the prima facie requirements of
generosity conflict with those of justice—the phronimos might
well have to work through a train of reflection, the conclusion of
which would be naturally expressed in just that way. I can also
imagine situations (“hard cases” in a different sense) in which,
the stakes being high and the costs of right action dreadful, the
virtuous agent might find it necessary simply to remind himself
of his deepest commitments and the reasons behind them, as a
sort of Platonic incantation (cf. Phaedo 77e-8a, 114d-e, Crito
54d, Symposium 215d-e).
I infer that the real moral objection is not to superfluous and
corrupting thoughts, but to thoughts that we naturally inter-
pret as expressing antecedent corruption. To take a simpler case
of a “thought too many,” we would be quite disturbed if on
asking a student about his plans over the summer, he were to
respond, “Well, I certainly won’t go around shooting and killing
lots of people. That’s right out.” The problem here is not that the
propositional content is incorrect, or that the explicit thinking
of such a thought could cause moral harm: rather, the fact that
he’s thinking it shows he’s in deep trouble already.
It might be objected, however, that there is a distinctive
problem to be raised about the agent who has a compulsive
need to justify every action as a deduction from first principles,
say about the eudaimonistic benefits of virtuous action; in this
case it does seem easy to imagine such a habit of reflection
itself as “corrupting.” Even in this case, though, I would suggest
that such reflection is not necessarily in itself a cause or even
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an expression of corruption. A compulsive recourse to first
principles in deliberation might be as morally harmless (though
epistemically neurotic) as any other compulsion, such as the
need to check over and over whether one has locked the front
door. If we imagine the hyperdeductive agent as a corrupt
agent, it is, I think, because we imagine his reasoning as an
attempt to persuade or bully himself, indicative of tenuous
continence rather than virtue—again, as the symptom of a
problem rather than the cause of one.
So too, it seems to me, in the Aristotelian or pseudo-
Aristotelian cases Broadie is concerned about. Moreover, I
would hazard the claim that there are no particular thoughts
that always express moral narcissism or crass egoism; nor,
conversely, are there any particular thoughts that are required
for these forms of moral weakness to warp or contaminate our
deliberations. This is why our intuitions are so sensitive to the
context and presentation of “a thought too many” cases; we are
really judging the character traits that we read off from the
thoughts imputed to the agent, and the propositional content of
those thoughts always underdetermines the traits.
In sum, it seems to me that we should avoid the temptation
to prescribe general rules as to what the deliberation of the
virtuous agent must or must not involve: “acting for the sake of
the fine” should be allowed to involve as many thoughts or as
few as any particular situation might demand. The upshot of all
this for Broadie’s argument is as follows. It may well be that
the virtuous agent and the decent agent will think the same
thoughts in deliberation, most of the time at least. After all,
they share either a common “framework” or two largely
overlapping ones (the analogy, as I’ve said, could be worked out
in different ways). But nothing about this offers any particular
support to the natural account of virtue. To avoid imputing a
thought too many to the virtuous agent, all we need to do is
guard against confusing her theoretical commitments with her
occurrent thoughts on particular occasions. And if the natural
account entails that the motivating thoughts of the virtuous
person cannot go beyond those available to the decent person, it
seems to me to place her in an unnecessary deliberative
straitjacket.
2. Decency and the
Stability of Virtue
So it remains perfectly possible that for Plato and Aristotle,
virtue and mere decency, for all their resemblance in operation,
are still two very different states. To see whether this is so, we
need to turn to the portraits of decency the two provide.
Broadie’s reading of the Myth of Er seems to me right in many
important ways, but I want to question her claim that the
decent man depicted in the Myth should be considered
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genuinely virtuous. For Plato describes him in terms that seem
calculated to raise doubts on exactly that point. The decent
man, he says, “participated [meteilêphota] in virtue through
habit and without philosophy” (Rep. 619c). Now “participation”
[metalambanein] is what sensible particulars do in relation to
Forms, and it gives equivocal results: the sensible particulars
that participate in the form of Beauty are, notoriously, not-
beautiful as well (Symp. 211a, Phaedo 74b, etc.). It is also
telling that the decent man is said to be virtuous by habit
[ethos] and without philosophy [aneu philosophias]. He is
clearly the successor to those described at Phaedo 82a-b as
having “practiced popular and social virtue [dêmotikê kai
politikê aretê], which they call moderation and justice and
which was developed by habit and practice [ethos, nb, kai
meletê], without philosophy [aneu philosophias, again] or
understanding” (82a11-b3). Such people have the happiest
destiny of the nonphilosophers: they will be reincarnated as
members of “a social and gentle group, either of bees or wasps
or ants” (82b6-7). At the same time this passage hearkens
directly back to Phaedo 68-9, where the tone is much darker:
here, those who unphilosophically practice what is generally
called courage and moderation are said to have “only an illusory
appearance of virtue,” fit for slaves, involving nothing healthy
or genuine (69b6-8). Now Broadie suggests that the Myth of Er
could be read as a correction of the Phaedo (112, n. 22); and
admittedly politikê is also used at Republic 430c for the courage
of the Auxiliaries, which must be something better than a
slavish illusion. In the most extended Platonic text on politikê
aretê, the “Great Speech” in the Protagoras, Protagoras argues
that, in order for communities to survive at all, it must be
attainable by all and systematically fostered by society, through
a “teaching” that sounds more like the nonrational inculcation
of good habits (321d, 322e-3b, 324a). How this civic virtue
relates to the unitary virtue, identical with knowledge, toward
which Socrates repeatedly drives the argument is a question
that the Protagoras leaves us to work out for ourselves. But in
any case, taken together, these passages suggest that politikê as
applied to virtue in Plato means something like “the virtue
inculcated, recognized and relied upon by the city,” thus
covering an enormous range from the pseudo-virtue of the
“moderate” man in an ordinary, corrupt society to the courage of
the Auxiliaries in the kallipolis.4  And if this is what Plato
means us to ascribe to the Er-man, his virtue is at best ambig-
uous and incomplete.
So Aristotle is using language with a history when he
introduces Spartan decency as a “civic disposition,” hexis
politikê (EE VIII.3, 1248b38). Earlier in the EE, he has spoken
of “civic courage” [politikê andreia], saying variously that it is
due to shame (1129a13, cf. 1230a21) and to law (1129a29-30);
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and he sharply distinguishes it from the real thing (alêtheia,
1229a30, alêthês, EE III.1, 1230a25; cf. NE III.8, 1116a). (“Civic
friendship,” on the other hand, a form of friendship based on
utility, does count as a genuine form of friendship, though
certainly not the best or primary kind [1236a-7a, cf. 1242a-3b,
cf. NE 1163b34, 1167b2].) As to whether Spartan decency is real
virtue, the evidence of VIII.3 itself is, as Broadie admits (111, n.
11), ambiguous, or rather confusing. The Spartans are flatly
declared to be good (at least if we accept the plausible
emendation of agathoi for, of all things, agrioi at 1249a1), so
that good things are good for them (if we also accept Solomon’s
reasonable supplement of agatha in 12491). But they do not
possess fine things di’ auta (1249a2-3), which seems to mean
they do not act for the sake of the fine (1249a5-6), and instead
do fine actions only kata sumbebêkos (1249a14-16), thus failing
a central criterion of Aristotelian virtue—a criterion he here
reaffirms, saying that the kalokagathos does fine things, that is,
virtuous actions, for their own sake (1248b34-7). Broadie must
insist that this distinction applies only “outside” the framework
of virtue itself, while “within” it, on particular occasions, the
Spartan too is motivated by the fine. If so, Aristotle does
remarkably little to make his meaning clear—though admittedly,
it is hard to think of a reading of this very confusing chapter
that would not give that result.
 The obvious philosophical objection to counting mere
decency as virtue is raised in the last part of Plato’s Meno.
Socrates here insists, perhaps surprisingly, that right opinion is
every bit as good and beneficial, while it lasts, as knowledge
(97b-c, 98c-e). But this “while it lasts” makes all the difference,
for right opinions are like the statues of Daedalus: they run
away and so are not worth much after all. Socrates assimilates
this kind of unstable right opinion to the divine inspiration of
soothsayers and prophets (99c). He sums up as follows:
virtue would be neither an inborn quality nor taught, but comes
to those who possess it as a gift from the gods which is not
accompanied by understanding, unless there is someone among
our statesmen who can make another into a statesman. If there
were one, he could be said to be among the living as Homer said
Teiresias was among the dead, namely that “he alone retained
his wits while the others flitted about like shadows.” In the same
manner such a man would, as far as virtue is concerned, here
also be the only true reality compared, as it were, with shadows.
(99e-100a)
Socrates is here bringing the dialectic of the Meno back to
its very beginning, and answering Meno’s opening question as
to how virtue is acquired. And Plato’s results, which Aristotle
gives us no reason to reject, are clear. Real virtue is constituted
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by knowledge or wisdom (for Aristotle, phronesis). Those who do
the right thing without that knowledge, on the basis of mere
opinion, are guided by a kind of divine inspiration. Such people
have virtue only in a very qualified sense, and though the
phrase politikê aretê is not used in the Meno it is striking that
the examples are statesmen such as Themistocles. Theirs is a
mere shadowy appearance, a ghost compared to the reality of a
virtue constituted by knowledge. As Socrates’ very telling simile
brings out, it is defective not just because it cannot be reliably
transmitted, but because of the internal defectiveness that
causes that instability.
As we can see from the Meno’s Teiresias simile, from the
Phaedo’s reduction of civic virtue to insect sociability, and from
Broadie’s very illuminating reading of the Myth of Er, the
afterlife in Plato is this life, seen clearly for the first time. As
Broadie notes, the particular focus of the Myth is on the perils
of context-free choice (the dark side, we might say, of the “choice
of lives” trope); it is, as she very acutely observes, the mirror
image of the ring of Gyges story in Book II (112, n. 25). The
moral of both tales is just the same: take a decent person,
virtuous by the standards of ordinary society, grant him the
magical power to fulfill his fantasies, and the result will be a
tragedy—or perhaps a horror movie. The ring of Gyges story
reads as folk-tale, the Myth as eschatology, but this life does
present such situations. The Greeks would think of the aspiring
tyrant; we might think of the decent businessman or honorable
soldier transplanted to the Belgian Congo:
You can’t understand. How could you?—with solid pavement
under your feet, surrounded by kind neighbors ready to cheer
you or to fall on you, stepping delicately between the butcher and
the policeman, in the holy terror of scandal and gallows and
lunatic asylums—how can you imagine what particular region of
the first ages a man’s untrammeled feet may take him into by
the way of solitude—utter solitude without a policeman—by the
way of silence—utter silence, where no warning voice of a kind
neighbor can be heard whispering of public opinion? These little
things make all the great difference. When they are gone you
must fall back upon your own innate strength, upon your own
capacity for faithfulness.5
Conrad’s response to the problem is resolutely anti-intellectual
and thus anti-Platonic: staying the course depends on “your
strength … the faith in your ability for the digging of
unostentatious holes to bury the stuff in—your power of
devotion, not to yourself, but to an obscure, backbreaking
business” (Heart of Darkness, 59). The two disagree radically
on the (in principle surely empirical) question of what—if
anything—provides a reliable brake against the immense moral
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temptations that come with context-free impunity, for which
“darkness” in Conrad and ‘invisibility’ in the ring of Gyges story
provide precisely equivalent metaphors. Plato’s answer is that
our salvation lies in understanding, without which no trait of
moral character can be resilient. And we can see why he should
be fairly confident of this: for he takes human beings to be
above all and by nature rational creatures (cf. e.g., Rep. X, 611b-
2a). For us to be virtuous in the absence of good reasons to be
so is to be in standing violation of our nature—a more un-
natural condition, perhaps, than not to be virtuous at all.
Now Eudemian Ethics VIII is (as I hope to show elsewhere,
cf. n. 3) in large part structured as a meditation on the Meno,
and in particular on its opening topos: whether virtue comes
from teaching (i.e., whether it is knowledge), practice, nature or
in some other way (70a). Aristotle appropriates this question for
the opening of the Eudemian Ethics, applying it instead to
happiness and expanding the list of candidates—no doubt on
the basis of the end of the Meno—to include luck or good
fortune [tuchê, eutuchia] and divine inspiration [epipnoia
daimoniou tinos] (1214a15-25). In Eudemian Ethics VIII he
then returns, in a kind of ring-composition, to this opening
problem. Chapter 1 considers and resolves difficulties with the
view that virtue is knowledge (the correct view so long as we
are careful to understand it as phronesis and not epistêmê);
Chapter 2 then considers whether good fortune, another of the
I.1 candidates, could serve as a substitute. This prospect in turn
summons up two of the other candidates, since this fortunate
person would seem to be fortunate by nature (1247a9-31) and/or
to have a kind of divine touchstone or guidance (1248a26-b7)—
though what Aristotle actually has to say about these options is,
in the text as we have it, thoroughly garbled.
In sum, the first two chapters of Eudemian Ethics VIII look
like Aristotle’s final, result-confirming review of his position
that phronesis, alone of the Book I candidates, is the source of
virtue and happiness. None of this dictates that the Spartans
could not count as virtuous, since Aristotle might (and on
Broadie’s reading presumably does) allow that they possess
phronesis. Still, we should expect Aristotle to be especially
uneasy here at the prospect of a virtue that, like Spartan
decency, is actually dependent on irrationality. The Spartan is,
as Broadie grants, rationally defective in his practice of virtue,
insofar as he practices virtue for the sake of the natural goods
even when virtue requires sacrificing the natural goods. The
Spartan evidently believes (1) the greatest goods for a human
being, the possession of which is constitutive of happiness, are
the natural goods; and (2) the practice of the virtues is valuable
because it is invariably the best strategy for acquiring the
natural goods.6  And not only is (1) false as a matter of moral
theory; (2) is (thanks to the “invariably”) demonstrably false as
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a matter of empirical fact. Broadie notes the empirical
vulnerability of the Spartan’s beliefs and has very interesting
things to say about the implications—“His virtue is a set of
habits which, where it really exists, operates independently of
his ideology” (108)—and about the stratagems by which the
clash between his theory and practice might be reconciled. But
she takes the problem to be significant only for the trans-
mission of virtue over the generations: the Spartan’s son will
see that his father is in the grip of optimistic illusions and
reject his principles. There is no reason, however, to assume
that the adult Spartan himself will be immune to a similar
moment of truth. Indeed the Spartan who never realizes that
his moral framework is at odds with both his practice and his
experience is either ignorant and lucky (in his lack of repre-
sentative experience) or irrational. And for Aristotle as for Plato
it would be an intolerable paradox to claim that virtue might be
secured by ignorance or irrationality. It only makes matters
worse if we suppose that the Spartan’s moral decency sets up
barriers to his recognition of the problem: we would then have
to say that he is virtuous through intemperance, since the
virtuous lower part of his soul refuses to register the implica-
tions of his intellectual attachment to the natural goods.
It is surely no coincidence that this possibility too is passed
under review in Eudemian Ethics VIII. In chapter 1, Aristotle
considers the paradoxical case in which there is virtue in the
irrational part of the soul but ignorance in the rational part
(1246b12-32). This recurs in a slightly different guise in chapter
2: what are we to say about the man who desires rightly and
acts well “contrary to knowledge” or without correct reasoning?
(1247b18-8a16). Such a person is here (if I understand this very
confusing passage) discussed as lucky, and anyone consistently
lucky in this way is presumably divinely inspired (cf. again
Meno 99b-100a). In VIII.3, the Spartan’s politikê hexis is, I
suspect, Aristotle’s third stab at the characterization of this
paradox-generating combination of practical decency and
rational inadequacy. If so, the Spartans have at best a non-
rational “civic” quasi-virtue, like the statesmen of the Meno.
So I doubt that either Plato or Aristotle could allow that
Spartan decency, or the “habitual” virtue of the man in the
Myth of Er, is the same thing as virtue. The tendency of the
Spartans to practice virtue for the wrong reasons is not even
virtue of an incomplete sort; from the standpoint of philoso-
phers deeply committed to the sovereignty of reason, it can only
look like the wrong kind of disposition altogether. According to
Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes the Cynic was once asked where in
Greece he had seen good men: “Good men nowhere,” he answered,
“but good boys at Sparta” (VI.27). And for both Plato and
Aristotle, virtue is a grown-up business.
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Notes
1 Translations from Plato are from the various hands in J. M.
Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Hackett, 1997), sometimes with
revisions.
2 Cf. e.g., C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast (Oxford, 2002); R.
Kamtekar, “Imperfect Virtue,” Ancient Philosophy 18 (1998): 315–39.
3 Part of my comments at the Spindel conference, largely omitted
here (but cf. 123–4), discussed the organization and argument of
Eudemian Ethics VIII. My starting point was the worry that Broadie’s
treatment of the Spartans makes it difficult to see why Aristotle has
so little to say about them, and why what he says focuses so
obsessively on the single claim that while good things are good for
them, they are not also fine, as they are for the person of philosophical
virtue (1248b39-9a17). I hope to discuss these and other puzzles
presented by this text in a separate paper; my current sense is that a
fuller understanding of Aristotle’s purposes in VIII.3 in fact poses no
problems for Broadie’s reading.
4 Cf. also Laches 197a-c on what ordinary people call courage and
Meno 86e-100b, discussed below, on the virtue of statesmen.
5 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (New York, 1960), 58–9 (first
published 1902).
6 I am here being guided by Broadie’s admission that the theory of
the Spartans is liable to conflict with their experience, which implies
that their theory incorporates the false premise (2). The Spartans
might more plausibly hold instead a weaker (2a) virtue is for the most
part and in the long run the best strategy for obtaining the natural
goods, and with it (2b) virtue cannot be adopted selectively: precisely
because it is a disposition formed and sustained by inculcation and
habit, we do not really have the choice of dispensing with it on the
particular occasions on which to do so would pay. This is not far from
(on some interpretations) Plato’s answer to the charge that prospective
Guardians are required to violate their own self-interest by the
“return to the cave” in Republic VII. And (2a) is not so obviously
falsifiable as (2). But both (2a) and (2b) are still empirical propositions
that, it seems to me, many a Spartan is likely to doubt. And if a decent
Spartan can doubt (2b), as seems very likely, and can act on that
doubt, then it follows that it cannot be true. Why not cheat just this
once—take bribes while abroad as the Spartans notoriously did, or
exploit the natives on your colonial posting—and afterwards return
safely to life as a decent person? It seems empirically a very far-
fetched claim that to do so is impossible. Of course we feel an impulse
to stipulate that the “decent” person who behaves in this way is not
really decent, let alone virtuous; indeed this is entailed by the initial
conception of the decent person as one who always obeys the dictates
of virtue. But then (2b) becomes a matter of stipulation rather than a
robust, in principle empirical claim about human psychology, and (2a)
becomes indistinguishable from the stronger and less plausible (2).
